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COMMENTARY / *KOMENTAR*

THE THIRD WORLD REMNANT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: MALAYSIA'S POST-PANDEMIC REALITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH© Σ

SISA DUNIA KETIGA DALAM DUNIA MEMBANGUN: REALITI PASCA-PANDEMIK MALAYSIA DAN HUBUNGAN ANTARABANGSA SELATAN GLOBAL

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Introduction

> "… we must admit that no one can possibly know the extraordinarily complex unity of our globalised world, despite the reality that, as one said at the outset, the world does have a real interdependence of parts that leaves no genuine opportunity for isolation." (Said 2003, xxi).

Edward Said's comment in a new preface of *Orientalism* reminds us of the vast amount of work still required in contemporary scholarship. As the Ghanian economist George Ayittey observes, the discipline of international relations (IR) and its associated university programmes have set the discourse of 'problems' and 'solutions' within a Eurocentric perspective. Therefore, there is a repeated cascade of mistakes and circulation of problems rather than a pursuit of practical or straightforward solutions within the local context.

Although such mistakes are common among practitioners and to a certain extent among IR scholars, the root of this obstacle lies within the discipline itself and the way it is practised in the so-called Global South. Acharya argues that IR neglects those outside the 'core' states of the western hemisphere (Acharya 2014), hence, Eurocentric discourse is deeply rooted. Having long focussed on power plays and the behaviours of the so-called Great Powers and post-Westphalian states, Hans Morgenthau argues that states of the developing world—i.e., the apparent empty spaces of Africa and Asia—are often represented as victim's incapable of making any systemic changes.[1] Furthermore, Stephen Waltz argues that IR is a major United States (US) social science discipline, contrary to IR's universalising aspirations. Thus, western-centric,

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and mainstream IR essentially simplifies investigations by abstracting a nearly universal Western meta-narrative of history and seeking to celebrate, defend and promote the West as a normative referent within the international political system (IPS). Kang highlights the incompatibility between western IR theories and their application to Asian states (Kang 2003). Cognisant of these criticisms, numerous IR scholars have demanded a theoretical and discursive expansion of the discipline while preventing parochialism by embracing a larger range of non-Western histories, experiences, and theories. There has been increased diversity[2] in this effort, especially in highlighting a previously underrepresented segment of non-Eurocentric IR theorists (e.g., Peter Katzenstein, Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan).

To further understand this 'benign' negligence, we revisit Rozman's (2015) argument in *Misunderstanding Asia*, wherein IR's development as an academic discipline from the 1970s to 1990s was too centralised in terms of its notion of the 'balance of power', one which was based on the Cold War-era security dilemma and China's ascendancy in Asia. Realist concerns permeated its theoretical foundations and paved the way for an overemphasis on interpreting the 'strategic triangle'. Meanwhile, China (as Asia's main rising power) and its hegemonic equivalent were ignored entirely until the 1980s, when China was finally placed into the theoretical context due to the supposed start of a 'new Cold War' (exemplified by cases such as the debate over Sinovac and Pfizer vaccines, or the US-China trade war). This neglect can be blamed on IR theory's mix of realism and liberalism. In addition, IR theories and frameworks generally err on the side of convergence and globalisation. Furthermore, Asian 'regionalism' during the end of the Cold War (the early 1990s) and the Asian monetary crisis were ignored since IR scholars did not acknowledge Asian regionalism as being key to greater forms of institutionalisation, an international community (i.e., akin to the European Union) was not eventually pursued. Rozman further argues that his argument is premised on a failure to articulate an appropriate framework for a supposed Huntington-Esque 'clash of civilisations' (Rozman 2015, 17). With that, IR must incorporate non-western civilisational claims, since this has been the root cause of misunderstanding Asia—understandably, Asia could not have simply "complied" with Eurocentric theories and arguments, ill-equipped as they are to analyse developing countries and their persistence with so-called 'Third World' discourse.

Many questions remain: First, why are some of the present problems of the developing world still framed in the context of the Third World? Second, what have we *not* learned about developing countries? Third, can we, as non-western scholars, presumably from developing countries, contribute to IR's theoretical foundations? Lastly—and specifically for Malaysian scholars and practitioners—can Third World discourse contribute to better understanding stratification during the Covid-19 pandemic?

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Systemic Problems, Underrepresentation and Continued Third World Discourse

The concept of the 'developing world' was not hugely different from its predecessor, the Third World (*tiers monde*), a term first coined by French scholars in the 1950s (Muni 1979). It included Europe's and the US's underdeveloped former colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Initially rooted in the political and power context of the Cold War and its political blocs, the term soon became synonymous with the Non-Aligned Movement in Asia and Africa. According to the Maoist 'Theory of Three Worlds', the international system could actually be stratified into three layers: (1) the US and the Soviet Union belonged to the 'First World', (2) countries such as Canada, Australia and much of Europe in the second, and (3) the rest of the world in the third. It depicted the imperialistic and hegemonic presence of the two antagonistic powers, extending their exploitative nature downward.

But the Third World's concept was still insufficient and, therefore, further investigated and expanded in the 1960s at the height of the Cold War when Western academicians began investigations into its political institutions and processes—particularly its distinctive political cultures and policy orientations. Economic development issues were becoming prominent, thus reducing the monopoly of security and strategic issues in the discourse of international politics (Muni 1979) and, by extension, over the Third World. Now, it is states, which were neither completely industrialised nor had free markets or centrally planned economies (associated with the First and Second Worlds), were seen as having designed viable and functional systems of and approaches to economic development. Yet Third-World states were still generally regarded as economically ill-equipped, underdeveloped and normally Asian, African, and Latin American.

The comprehension of varying levels of poverty, underdevelopment and economic behaviours were often neglected in the context of global economic comparisons. By the 1970s, a holistic approach to the concept was introduced, which relied on two criteria (i.e., overall poverty and underdevelopment), in accordance with the gross national product (GNP), per capita income and levels of industrialisation, among others (Fiddian-Qasimiyeh and Daley 2018). This approach began in the aftermath of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis, where wealthy and capable developing and oil-producing states were able to disrupt the First World's industrialised free-market economies, thus menacing the international economic system. This ushered in a new international economic order, and with that, the First World, by design or not, weakened this Third World united front by subdividing it into different "ranks". Scholars immediately began conceptualising a "Fourth World" but met with resistance from the non-First World scholarly community, which led to the Global North-Global South debate. The North favoured the accentuation of *ranks,* whereas the South favoured treating *all* developing countries as Third World states.

This debate eventually favoured the Global North due to diplomatic and strategic considerations resulting from the oil crisis, and the Third World concept was posited as one that neglected differences between 'underdeveloped' countries, oil-exporting countries, and newly industrialised countries (NICs). This concept was also often negatively connotated with neocolonialism (i.e., economic dependency in postcolonial states), otherness and backwardness, while new paradigms such as globalisation were

neglected. Furthermore, statistical indicators on poverty and developmental data such as gross national income (GNI), gross domestic product (GDP) and the Human Development Index (HDI) further disrupted the Third World's initial parameters.

By the late 1980s, the United Nations, alongside financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, began adopting the term 'developing world' instead (Calvert and Calvert 2007, 488). Measured by GDP, it could be divided into (1) low-income countries (i.e., which had failed to develop an appropriate quality of life and were crucially dependent on a single raw export), (2) lower and upper-middle-income countries (i.e., which made efforts to escape global poverty standards), (3) oil-producing countries (i.e., which garnered high incomes from oil but remained relatively low in terms of sustained economic growth) and NICs. Yet this classification is still insufficient: today, the notion of development is much more complex than before, and the concept lacks considerations of not just increased production but also social facilities, for example.

In this sense, remnants of the Third World concept remain salient in terms of this replacement term's ambiguity. The discourse on the developing world may devolve into economic or political considerations since development agendas also change over time. Todaro argues that rather than be seen as a deviation from or an improvement upon the Third World concept, the developing world must be conceived as a multispectral *process* which accounts for major alterations such as social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions—together with the usual aspects such as economic growth, reduction of inequality and eradication of poverty (Todaro 1993). Development must also encompass profound changes in social systems and subscribe to myriad basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups thus, it should deviate from maintaining a single view of life conditions.

What Have We Not Learned *in Depth* So Far about Developing Countries?

IR is a 'living' discipline, and therefore, unprecedented changes and alterations can emerge if new debates and discoveries emerge. The question should not be 'what have we not learned so far?', but rather 'what have we not learned *in depth* so far about developing countries?'. IR's lack of comprehension of postcolonialism with regard to the conflict in developing countries is the key neglect. Colonialism has purged many former constitutive norms and practices, and with imported and invented notions of sovereignty, territory and nationalistic aspirations emerging, unavoidable clashes have emerged along two dimensions: (1) treating similar historical regions as a means of comparison and (2) formulating contemporary ideas of territory, statehood, exclusivity differentiation and allegiance. It is, therefore, urgent to revisit historical processes and cultural anthropological lenses outside the regular bounds of IR (Chatterjee 2017).

While such conflicts are maintained by unreliable elites who take advantage of them to expand illegitimate rule, which leads to population displacement, insurgencies, revolutions etc., explanations along such lines depart from conventional IR theories. But such abnormalities in terms of geopolitical interests among postcolonial states must be investigated regarding correlations between local conceptions of state, nation, and territoriality. Uncovering the seeds of conflict during decolonisation and positing these as the main factors in post-independence territorial conflict is insufficient, especially since elites obtain not just territory but also political legitimacy (Chatterjee 2017).

Hence, the crucial basis of such conflicts is domestic and not external in nature.

New forms of asymmetric statism have appeared in developing countries, including regime sustainability, territory, sovereignty, and the absolute rights of states as the sole legal representatives of their societies at the international level. Normally, these factors ignite domestic conflicts that often link Western-style sovereign rights with 'race'. This unsettling primacy of identity has formed *within* both fluid and solid-state borders, a clear-cut example of IR's inability to formulate rationales for such conflicts. The developing world also compromises many economic, political, and material practices originating from the West, harkening back to historical inequalities and brutal exchanges: these complex interactions still shape postcolonial trajectories. Thus, IR must further construct a holistic and inclusive comprehension of developing states (including their internal factors) as a prerequisite to explaining conflict. This is because 'at some point, comprehending the term 'post-' in 'postcolonialism' can be ambiguous: is it a temporal duration after the demise of colonialism proper, or should it be seen in terms of political transitions to native rulers? IR must also consider 'political freedom', since it ought to comprehend developing countries through this lens instead of through Western meta-narratives on the expansion of contemporality, capitalism and the international community—in such narratives, colonialism loses its leading role as the focus of analysis. With that, the discipline should also consider prioritising this unpleasant history of the exchange in postcolonial discourse (Chatterjee 2017).

The root cause of conflict can also be comprehended through the deficiencies in IR's classical building block—realism—which has constantly been overlooked in IR analyses of the developing world (Lizée 2011). Its variant, neorealism, is considered below since the realist approach often guides policymaking at the global level. Traditional comprehensions of realism, as underlined by Machiavellian ideas (and of late, much of Morgenthau's) of 'classical realism', see state violence as rooted in human ordeals. In addition, Thomas Hobbes (and later Waltz) accentuated how violence emerged from the nature of the state and its inner structures. However, such frameworks fail to incorporate a developing state's zones of lawlessness, secession or guerrilla movements and even criminal gangs perpetrating violence at a significant scale, all of which threaten its authority (Weatherby *et al* 2017).

Thus, Lizée suggests how 'inadequate stateness' explains why such violence persists in the developing world, based on two premises (Lizée 2011). First, such violence already persists throughout all of society and becomes externally visible once the state is too weak to halt or curb it. As a result, violence persists since internal power is no longer just political. Considering Western states in this context, development, as constructed through institutions, practices and norms, eventually limits the deployment of physical force in state power except when exhibited through laws, obligations, and administration, i.e., constitutionalism. There are defined limits of power, which insist upon the observation of regularised procedures, thus rendering those in power accountable for their actions (Lizée 2011). The 'paraphernalia' of constitutionalism, i.e., the law, its processes, divisions of power, checks and balances and individual human rights, do not necessarily abolish power *per se* but serve as regulators. Unfortunately, their absence or nascence in the developing world has led to constant or consistent acts of violence. Such findings are not just limited to the developing world, however, since Yugoslavia's post-dissolution stemmed from state failure and widespread violence.

This is where Realism comes into context since it contends that human rationality (as

per Machiavelli's and Morgenthau's conceptions) is an essential countervailing force against violence. While rationality may not diminish violence, it can allow for the supplementation of political aims as well as the growth of forms of non-violent politics and other formations of power. Regardless, violence can be an effective and valid tool of power, and hence the corollary is that for violence to take place, it must be organised and monopolised so that the state can use violence effectively to achieve its various aims or interests. But in the developing world's intra-state violence, little attention is given to this corollary.

It is imperative that we inquire into state- and institution-building, where the economy of violence evolves as a counterpoint to the state's (in)ability to control violence (Lizée 2011). In the developing world, the study of the state's nature and investigations into calculations and strategies revolving around the utilisation of violence are important, as per the realist perspective. Ultimately, Realism's 'rational agent' must be correlated with structural aspect of the international system, and state-centred aspects which are not limited to only unitary and robust politics (often assumed as the state-actor).

Meanwhile, in Waltz's conception of Neorealism, the main assumption is the distinction between domestic and international politics, where the latter applies a distinctive set of rules on the former's 'anarchic' condition. Hobbes's 'war of all against all' constitutes the idea that state institutions can monopolise violence within their own apparatus and pacify society in the process (Lizée 2011). Spaces or gaps within the state allow non-political norms to continue and for subsequent violence to determine political connections. Therefore, this is the main factor in foreign affairs.

However, this singular view fails to fully comprehend the underlying causes of or the persistence of violence in the developing world because of the distinction made between the internal and external dimensions of the state (as pertaining to the organisation and regulation of violence). Objections to Neorealism begin with the history and character of the developing world (Lizée 2011). Their (post)colonial parameters usher in a diminished notion of internal cohesion in dealing with economic and social disparities, ethnic conflict, and regional fissures. Given that most of these states were constructed from without during the colonial period, various ethnic and social groups coexisted within a political structure but lacked cohesion, hence raising tensions. Ethnic conflicts developed from dissatisfaction with (post)colonial parameters, in extreme cases leading to civil war (Lizée 2011), with external interventions (e.g., military force, peacekeeping, sanctions) made in support of one party. The internal dimension of a state can be a site of violence, which may spread externally beyond its borders.

Consequently, within the state, Neorealists would suggest that political cooperation targeting the reduction of violence is pursued while space is constructed for peace to be pursued from without. Waltz views violence as requiring the response of rational individuals (through consent, assembly, constructing principles etc.) to create a state monopoly of violence so that public agents can be organised to prevent the use of private force. As a result, the national system (in which people defend themselves) and the international system emerge:

> "The motor that drives neo-realism is a minimal key assumption: rational human beings, when confronted by generalised violence, will have no choice but to establish the Leviathan, a structure which will guarantee non-violent social relations within its boundaries." (Lizée 2011, 92).

However, this assumption fails to acknowledge how rationality encounters and deals with endemic violence, where rationality is not simply used for the organisation of violence but as a tool of social and political power. Developing postcolonial states, constructed from the outside, have generally not emerged through internal or indigenous consent, assembly, or principles. Ultimately, Neorealism fails to understand non-western global politics, where the principle that the 'coaction of like units [out of which] emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of them' does not necessarily apply.[3]

Plausible Contributions of the Developing World to IR

To be clear, it is our responsibility to contribute to more global-centric IR perspectives, even as students. Tickner argues that the discipline manifests a misfit between theoretical treatments of the world and fundamental global problems, thus warranting the inclusion of alternative sources of knowledge (Tickner 2003). A transition away from common positions and dominant perspectives is crucial. Tickner and others acknowledge explicitly the need for the discipline to include new spaces that were previously side-lined. Postcolonial approaches could unlock more vibrant arguments by emphasising the relationships between theoretical production and specific geographical, historical, and cultural processes. Post-positivist perspectives hold that human ideas have no universal 'shared' foundations: relativists (including postcolonial scholars) acknowledge multiple criteria and are more in favour of utilising alternative epistemes to reflect on oft-neglected issues or to conceptualise them in other ways (Edkins & Zehfuss 2013).

To Tickner, 'Third World knowledge' can contribute to IR through its distinctive features: (1) culture, (2) hybridity and (3) everyday life. Culture (and hence identity) has been of theoretical interest since its introduction during the post-Cold War era, given inconsistent perceptions of states' surroundings, hence allowing for a more holistic comprehension of certain events or phenomena. Nevertheless, power imbalances tend to disregard or question the legitimacy of diverse types of knowledge. The western narrative of universality is not so universal since it suppresses and negates other perspectives. In contrast, Hindu culture (excluding the Bharatiya Janata Party variety) embraces multiple religious and cultural identities yet espouses a sense of respect, tolerance, and loyalty, as with all religions which guide their worshippers on their paths to God.

Meanwhile, hybridity, coming after the work of Nestor Garcia and Homi Bhabha, describes the multifarious configurations of identity and temporality produced by transnational cultural phenomena such as imperialism and globalisation (Tickner 2003). Both scholars have used developing countries from Latin America as case studies to explain why regional culture influences modern forms of democracy and enables coexistence with clientelism. This has led to the comprehension of how dominant identities have been constructed from the colonial period, thus allowing for the negotiation of marginal, minority and subaltern perspectives versus the tidy linearity of modern narratives (as distinguished from postmodern ones). Due to their lack of conformity with the mainstream IR discourse, IR perspectives of Latin America were soon created by regional scholars with shared aspirations. This soon led to the hybridisation of the once-dominant US-based IR model, hence creating a better

comprehension of Latin America's regional politics.

As for everyday life, according to Tickner (2003), the by-product of an individual or even group experiences are world knowledge. Why? Because these experiences are the enabling factor allowing us to examine Third World knowledge as formulated by scholars in distinct academic settings. Such knowledge considers subjective and diverse everyday experiences or upbringings, for example, one's colonial legacy, political instability, poverty, insecurity etc. Tickner suggests how the political persecution of academics, diminished funding or even problems with educational institutions shape scholars' academic knowledge of the Third World. A lack of resources, such as internet connectivity and libraries, is a noted common ailment, while historical decolonisation experiences have led to a myriad of intellectual and political positions, further complicated by class variations between intellectuals in the struggle for independence and in anticolonial discourse (Weatherby *et al* 2017).

In sum, these three features of Third World knowledge have contributed to challenging the Eurocentric foundations of IR. For instance, in some African states, the slave trade's legacy radicalised intellectuals who widely used a neo-colonial discourse rather than a standard postcolonial posture when facing persistent economic and cultural domination. Besides Africa, Latin American dependency theory can be said to have been formulated as a response to US-style development theory centred on modernisation.

Malaysia's 'Third World Remnants' and the Covid-19 Pandemic

Let us begin with the economic background which led to Malaysia being classified as a developing state. Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has been successful at diversifying its economy away from initial agricultural- and commodity-centric production to robust manufacturing and services (e.g., electronics, microchips, semiconductors) (Burnell *et al* 2017).

However, the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly its lockdowns, had major economic implications especially for vulnerable households. As of July 2020, 5.6% of the population was now living in absolute poverty, thus requiring poverty alleviation policies targeted at the so-called 'Bottom 40' (B40) community. Businesses, especially small and medium enterprises, faced similar consequences. The lockdown measures were a root cause of these conditions and the apparent "indecisiveness" of the government led to poor policy choices. As a result, national productivity growth has been particularly hit, and has declined against global and regional comparators. Based on World Bank data in 2022, Malaysia needs to become more dependent on the state to sustain private sector activities, e.g., introducing government measures to prevent the decline in export-led growth and depletion of fiscal space, which limits public investment (and hence expansion).

Ongoing reform of key structural constraints are crucial for supplementing and maintaining development, in addition to the nationwide inoculation programme and holistic Covid-19 standard operating procedures to somewhat enable economic reopening and revitalisation. In spite of the pandemic's impacts, in 2021 the World Bank still classified Malaysia as a developing state with the potential of reaching a "developed" status in coming decades.

This classification inadvertently displays a contemporary remnant of its former Third

World status, a sore point since former Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's 2006 speech in relation to the Ninth Malaysia Plan on 'First World' facilities coexisting with a 'Third World mentality'—a simple example is how the Kuala Lumpur International Airport suffered poor management and working ethics, practices and norms, hence losing its Star Alliance airport rankings to Changi International Airport. His point was that many Malaysians espoused such a mentality because they did not appreciate the government's efforts over the years. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Malaysian education system, or other systems, failed to instil such values. This apparent "ungrateful" mentality is not as simplistic as it appears, since variations still showed up in some punitive attacks on the government during the first phase of the lockdowns particularly on social media platforms, condemning the prevention of civilian movements and business operations for apparent political reasons, thus missing the point about protecting public safety (the emergency declaration of 2021 is a different story, however, and not the subject of focus here). Initially, the vaccine rollouts introduced by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation also saw a degree of scepticism about state-led efforts involving vaccines, facilities, and even medical personnel, thereby affecting its initial phases, and requiring the cooperation of private hospitals and clinics as an improvisational measure.

The point is that a high degree of polarisation or politicisation exists, so it is not just a simple matter of 'ungratefulness'—in this case, the author observe that it extended to safety measures continued afterwards, from the grassroots to the parliamentary level, well into Dato' Sri Ismail Sabri Yaakob's tenure as prime minister as late as 2021. Regardless of whether certain decisions were politically motivated or not, every state effort or initiative is ultimately a work in progress. I argue that this is a sign of a 'Third World mentality' persisting, in which uncertainty regarding state intentions is rife, thus disrupting patriotic values and issues of national importance. But clearly, such discourse is not limited to the supposed Third World, given the anti-vaccine or anti-restriction protests in the US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Sweden, and Canada, for instance, built around the discourse of protecting 'rights' and 'freedom' while neglecting health—a Faustian bargain, if there ever was one.

We ask whether Third World characteristics do prevail in First World or apparent developed states and if yes, then what is often relegated to Third World knowledge has to be considered for within existing IR concepts, given that the discourse of the First to Third Worlds and the developing world are insufficient. This may be a simple example to start with, but it may yet be relevant.

Concluding Remarks

To sum up, IR remains highly contentious, from its ill-equipped analytical framework dealing with developing countries to the lack of much-needed Third World knowledge. As a living academic discipline, it must consider new discoveries and discourses. But even the incorporation of non-western IR frameworks, as seen in postcolonialism, may be incomplete. Epistemologically, the study of postcolonialism is still tied to the metropole, hence we can never fully comprehend the postcolonial world, given that discourse still omits voices, ideas, and thoughts to a degree.

Thus, Malaysia as a developing state can contribute its apparent "Third World mentality" to improving the Third World knowledge of IR, and such knowledge may

be key to comprehending differing responses to Covid-19—hence the demand for IR to go 'global'. But instead of constantly arguing about how we can incorporate these side-lined aspects of IR, maybe it is time for a different approach (Acharya and Buzan 2017). For example, Acharya's (2014) idea of a 'Global IR', from his speech at the annual Convention of International Studies Association in 2014, revolves around a pluralistic universalism which acknowledges and respects diversity, upholding 'world' history rather than relying on Eurocentric and American history, thus doing away with existing IR theories while integrating regionalism, abstaining from exceptionalism and acknowledging various forms of agency beyond material power (including normative actions and the domestic roots of global order). Yet this premature idea blossomed into criticisms from 'western defenders', among whom highlighted the idealistic model of 'one' form of global knowledge (i.e., a canon) and devolved into potentially essentialist representations. Nevertheless, we can now better comprehend this ever-evolving subject—this is the imperfect beauty of IR.

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Notes

[1] Quoted in Dunn, Kevin. 2001. "Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory." In *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, edited by Kevin Dunn and Martin Shaw, 2. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.. See also Morgenthau, Hans J. 1964. *The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: 356.

[2] See also Hua, Shipping. ed. 2018. *Routledge Handbook of Politics in Asia*. London: Routledge; Burnell, Peter., Vicky Randall, and Liese Rakner. eds. 2017. *Politics in the Developing World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Edkins, Jenny., and Meja Zehfuss. eds. 2013. *Global Politics: A New Introduction* (2nd Edition). London: Routledge.

[3] For more interesting and similar arguments, see also Domigues, Jorge I., and Ana Covarrubias. eds. 2015. *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in World Politics*. London: Routledge; Cheeseman, Nic., David Anderson, and Andrea Scheibler. eds. 2013. *Routledge Handbook of African Politics*. London: Routledge.

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