

COMPREHENSIVE DEFENCE: CHALLENGES FACED BY MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES (MAF) IN OPERATIONALISATION OF HANRUH

Pertahanan Komprehensif: Cabaran Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (MAF) dalam Pengoperasian HANRUH

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ABSTRACT

The idea of a collaborative approach by integrating national capabilities has been applied effectively since the First Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) to counter the aggressions of Communists insurgents. The synergised civil-military relations were vastly credited by scholars as one of the key elements in eliminating the security threat successfully. As Malaysia enjoys long periods of peaceful and prosperous development, the spirit of Comprehensive Defence (HANRUH) seems to be dissipating and fading away. The first Malaysia Defence White Paper (DWP) has once again brought the concept of HANRUH into light. The study revealed that there are a few glitches in Malaysia's defence ecosystem, besides the misperception of HANRUH as a military strategic concept exclusively for the Malaysia Armed Forces (MAF). The finding is based on the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis to determine the diminishing factors affecting the operationalisation of HANRUH. Subsequently, the study proposed a pragmatic approach through the lens of Social Constructivism, to mitigate those challenges faced by MAF.

Keywords: civil-military relations; comprehensive defence; Defence Studies; Defence White Paper; good governance

ABSTRAK

Idea pendekatan kerjasama yang menyatukan keseluruhan kekuatan negara telah dilaksanakan secara efektif sejak Darurat Malaya yang Pertama (1948-1960) untuk mengatasi pencerobohan insurgen komunis. Kerjasama bersepadu antara awam-

tentera, telah menerima pujian oleh para sarjana secara meluas sebagai salah satu unsur utama dalam menghapuskan ancaman keselamatan tersebut dengan jayanya. Ketika negara menikmati kemakmuran dan keamanan dalam satu tempoh masa yang panjang, semangat Keselamatan Menyeluruh (HANRUH) ini seakan-akan semakin lenyap dan pudar. Kertas Putih Pertahanan (DWP) Malaysia yang pertama telah membangkitkan semula konsep HANRUH untuk perhatian ramai. Kajian ini juga mengesan beberapa kelemahan dalam ekosistem pertahanan Malaysia, selain daripada persepsi bahawa HANRUH adalah satu konsep strategik ketenteraan khusus untuk Angkatan tentera Malaysian (ATM). Hasil kajian ini adalah berdasarkan kaedah Analisa Kekuatan, Kelemahan, Peluang dan Ancaman (SWOT) dalam menentukan faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi kelemahan pengoperasian HANRUH. Seterusnya, kajian ini turut mencadangkan satu pendekatan yang pragmatik melalui lensa sarjana konstruktivisme Sosial untuk mengatasi cabaran yang dihadapi ATM.

Kata kunci: hubungan awam-tentera; Pertahanan Menyeluruh; Pengajian Pertahanan; Kertas Putih Pertahanan; tadbir urus yang baik

INTRODUCTION

The idea of collaborative approach by integrating all national capabilities has been applied effectively since the First Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) to counter the aggressions of Communists insurgents. It has been repeatedly cited as a source of case study in many foreign military doctrines (Hack 2009; Ucko 2010). The synergised civil-military relations has been vastly credited by scholars as one of the key successful counter-insurgency factors (Ahmad 2019). Arguably, when the nation was under critical security threat, the cohesion and equilibrium connection between civil society and the military organisation was in the ideal form. As the nation has enjoyed long periods of peaceful and prosperous development, the spirit of HANRUH seems to be dissipating and fading away. The voice of disdain such as “*Askar hanya makan dan tidur*” literally meaning soldiers just eat and sleep, posted by a Malaysian tycoon on social media in 2019 (Annuar 2019). This was an indicator of the tax payers, especially among the elite group of society, begin to deprecate the roles and functions of Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF).

Leong (2020) questioned, “... does *Malaysia’s COVID-19 Outbreak Spells the Failure of HANRUH?*” He asserts that the widespread outbreak in Malaysia could have been avoided if the whole nation is familiar with the five principles of HANRUH: national solidarity, unity of the community, public vigilance, economic fortitude, and psychological resilience. This pandemic situation poses an imminent security threat that requires a ‘comprehensive defence to safeguard the nation from a severe

health crisis and eventually economic crisis. The puzzle is, what has been done since HANRUH was introduced back in the '80s after the end of the Second Malayan Emergency? Otherwise, the Malaysian government would have employed this defence concept to safeguard its national interests at the initial stage of the pandemic. There must be some glitches in Malaysia's defence ecosystem. This study is based on the SWOT Analysis to determine the diminishing factors affecting the implementation of HANRUH. Subsequently, the study proposed a pragmatic approach through the lens of constructivists to mitigate those challenges faced by MAF. Thus, enhance the capability of MAF as a credible future force and preparing the whole of Malaysia to answer the nation's call when the need arises.

WHAT IS HANRUH?

The term Comprehensive Security or *Pertahanan Menyeluruh* (HANRUH) was coined in 1986, during the second phase of counter insurgency (1968 to 1989). This total defence concept is one of the security mechanisms formed to eliminate the remnants of communist terrorists. In consideration of economic interests, the MAF was involved in civil development projects under the doctrine of Security and Development or *Keselamatan dan Pembangunan* (KESBAN), in line with the New Economic Policy (Amelia & Wan 2015). In 2019, the first Malaysia's Defence White Paper (DWP) included Comprehensive Defence as one of the three pillars in defence strategy. In fact, many local military experts and scholars regard Comprehensive Defence as "HANRUH 2.0". Since both concepts similarly advocate extensive support from the people and the whole government entities in national defence (Mahendra 2020). The basic idea of both HANRUH and Comprehensive Defence is similar but the latter has certain adaptations to the modernisation of technology and contemporary security threats.

The concept of HANRUH is defined as a form of overall and integrated defence involving government agencies, non-governmental bodies, private sectors, and citizens of Malaysia in order to protect the sovereignty and integrity of Malaysia. According to Zackry Mokhtar cited in Faisol et al (2011: 190):

"HANRUH is a total defence concept emphasizes on the use of human resources which was efficient, economical strength, unified actions from all government agencies as well as good international and regional relationship as a strategy to ensure the strength and sovereignty of the nation remains intact."

Whereby, the definition of Comprehensive Defence extracted from DWP (MINDEF 2020: 41) is as follows:

“Comprehensive Defence involves the synergistic application of both whole-of-government and the whole-of-society approaches to defend the nation in line with the concept of HANRUH. The process encompasses a continuous effort of building internal cohesion, enhancing defence preparedness, improving inter-agency coordination, strengthening nation-building, as well as boosting economic capacity and other aspects of national resilience in a thorough and sustainable manner.”

In other words, Malaysia’s Comprehensive Defence or HANRUH is a doctrine on mobilisation of all military and civil assets, including national resources, to increase national defence capability when facing an imminent internal or external security threats. The theory of total defence is an evolution of the practises embraced by Western European countries since the post-World War II era, mainly due to limited military budgets in sustenance of Cold War postures. There are many different versions of implementation, depending on each countries’ interest and security priority. The Scandinavian Model, adopted by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, focuses on the reserve and guard system. The Swiss and Swedish embarked into defence industry, local government and international organisations as part of their defence eco-system (Sydow 2018). The distinct aspect of the HANRUH and other models of total defence is: HANRUH does not have a conscript system or national service act that requires eligible male population into compulsory military training.

The concept of HANRUH was officially documented in Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (NDP) 2010, but it was a classified document by then, and no other ministry has cited the similar concept or the keyword HANRUH in their policy. Thus, this situation conceived a misconception of HANRUH as a military strategy exclusively for MAF. Eventually, influenced by the DWP launched in 2019, the Foreign Policy Framework and the Security and Public Order Policy under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) have finally shown some synchronisation on the concept of collaboration with the MAF (MINDEF 2020). However, the misperception of the public, even among government agencies, about HANRUH as a strategic tool exclusively for MAF has deeply rooted.

CHALLENGES FACED BY MAF IN OPERATIONALISATION OF HANRUH

Table 1 presents the challenges which are sub-divided into four categories based on the SWOT Analysis method. Political will as the primary challenge for Strength, inter-agencies rivalries are identified as the Weakness, contemporary security context as the Opportunity, and lastly, information vacuum is considered as the Threat, in the implementation of HANRUH.

TABLE 1. SWOT Analysis Matrix - Operationalisation of HANRUH

POSITIVE IMPACT	NEGATIVE IMPACT
STRENGTHS - Political Will	WEAKNESSES - Inter-agency Rivalry
- Good Governance	- MAF as supporting role in HANRUH
- DWP 2020 - Transparency	- Rivalry for prestige & funding - ESSCOM
- Voice of Military Veteran	- Overlapping power & duties - ESSCOM
- Equilibrium Civil-Military Relations	- Limitation on authority – OP BENTENG
OPPORTUNITIES - Security Context	THREATS - Information Vacuum
- The 1st and 2nd Malayan Emergency	- Negative Impact of Media
- Lahad Datu Incident – OP DAULAT	- Extremist propaganda in social media
- Seasonal Flash Floods – OP MURNI	- Poor Public Awareness
- COVID-19 Pandemic – OP PENAWAR	- Misperception – corruptions, failed projects

Source: Gurel & Tat (2017:1001)

The Strengths and Opportunities are considered as challenges, despite both supposedly having a positive impact. This is part of the limitation in SWOT method, since the SWOT matrix is just a snapshot of the organisation at a specific moment in time (Gurel & Tat 2017). The analysis outcomes might be obsolete due to the rapidly changing of both internal and external environments. After all, Political Stability is the intervening variable. Generally, political turmoil indicates a weak and divided ruling administration. An unstable political situation will have various negative impact on economic and societal security as well (Croissant 2018). Only under a stable political environment, the MAF could have whole-of-government support as advocated in HANRUH. Therefore, a consistent and unified political leadership that prioritises national security is essential for MAF to operationalise the concept of HANRUH effectively.

1. The Strength. Political will is defined as the commitment of the ruling administrators to initiate particular actions to achieve the objectives. The concept of political will is complex and hard to assess accurately because it is prone to manipulation and misrepresentation. The extent of Political will can be measured through government official speeches, manifestos or published legal documents and it has to be sustained over time (Brinkerhoff 2010). In this article, the political will is considered as the strength for MAF based on a comparison between the

periods before and after 14th General Election (GE 14) in 2018. Shortly after an unprecedented took over administration by the opposition alliance parties in the history of Malaysia. The 'New Malaysia' government has setup the Defence Reform Committee (DRC) and published the DWP. The commitment of the ruling government to promote the idea of HANRUH and to maintain an equilibrium civil-military relations is an enabling act that gives MAF an optimal capability and added values in its strength. The challenge for MAF is to uphold the three elements of good governance, transparency, integrity, and accountability among the policymakers in the defence sectors and within the armed forces authorities.

2. The Weaknesses. At organisational level, “.. weakness is a limitation or deficiency in resource, skills, and capabilities that seriously impede an organization’s effective performance” (Pearce & Robinson 1991: 182). Weakness can also refer to situations where the existing capacities of an organisation are restricted compared to its competitor organizations (Gurel & Tat 2017). In this context, the weakness for MAF to operationalise HANRUH will be the aspects of rivalry with other civil agencies. The HANRUH’s whole-of-government concept requires MAF to collaborate with other government agencies especially during peace time or internal crisis. Referring to the federal constitution of Malaysia, most of these inter-agency operations are the secondary function of MAF. For instance, MAF is playing a supporting role in Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operation under the umbrella of the National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) and as reinforcement to assist Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) during an internal security crisis.

Arguably, the weaknesses faced by MAF are more towards limitation on the capacity of authority rather than a deficiency in skills and capabilities. After all, MAF’s primary mandate is to defend the national sovereignty and interest through the organic military operations against a traditional threat from other state actors. The issue of lack of judiciary authorities came to light in 2016, after the incident of a military personnel on duty shooting and killing a suspect, who was trying to escape from a border security checkpoint. The incident revealed that there was neither legal authority nor constitutional legislations to allow military personnel to conduct public arrest or execute law enforcement outside of the gazetted security area. Subsequently, Law of Malaysia Act 776 was enacted, National Security Council Act 2016 is to provide for the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), the declaration of security areas, the unique powers of the Security Forces in the security areas, and other related matters. However, the reformation of NSC does not immediately solve the issue of overlapping of power and duties. The contemporary non-traditional threats, such as trans-border organised crimes have made the thin line in between security and defence becomes even more blurry. The rivalry among existing security forces and the newly formed law enforcement agencies is getting worse due to scarcity in resources.

3. The Opportunities. “Opportunities are conditions in the external environment that allow an organization to take advantage of organizational strengths, overcome organizational weaknesses or neutralise environmental threats” (Gurel & Tat 2017: 998). On that score, the best opportunity for a defence force to display its real strength and capability will be given a chance in combating formidable opponent. Under contemporary security context, MAF has less opportunity to engage in severe security crisis compared to her neighbouring partners. Therefore, MAF must grab every opportunity and to perform well in all given missions, including regional and global as well. Professionalism and Preparedness are the essential requirements to grab the opportunity to enhance civil-military relations. The frequency of HADR missions has been increasing for the past two decades and demands more commitments from MAF.

MAF personnel must be well trained in both conventional military roles and the soft skills dealing with the public. Troop’s deployment for the military operations other than war (MOOTW) mission, such as HADR, supporting law enforcement has been more frequent than confronting traditional military threats. Besides offering assistance to neighbouring countries that are hit by catastrophic natural disasters such as tsunami, earthquakes and typhoons. Within homeland Malaysia, MAF is always on the alert during the Northeast monsoon seasons. Operations MURNI (OP MURNI) is one of the MOOTW mission, which focuses on relief and rescue victims affected by the seasonal flood. The MAF’s involvement in HADR missions within Malaysia and abroad offers an opportunity to display its soft power and defence diplomacy. Effectiveness and efficiency in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) certainly have a positive impact on the MAF’s credibility and reputation. In the latest COVID-19 pandemic crisis, MAF has been heavily engaged in OP PENAWAR to assist the civil authorities in the enforcement of MCO at different phases. The hindsight of the current pandemic has offered a rare opportunity to show that Malaysia is able to beat the odds. Significantly flatten the epidemic curve and effectively put this pandemic under control, while many developed countries are still struggling to contain the outbreaks. This achievement shows that the majority of Malaysians have a high degree of resilience, obedience, and cooperation in times of crisis. The public community has realised the importance of individual responsibility and the sacrifices and contributions of the frontliners in combating the pandemic. The momentum of these patriotism and volunteerism sentiments should be fully utilised in promulgating the concept of HANRUH.

4. The Threat. Views from the perspective of organisational management, threat is defined as the component that preventing the organisation from achieving its objectives (Tamam & Macar 2017). Information Vacuum is defined as the time gap between the crisis occurrence and the reliable communication established by an appropriate authoritative source (IGI Global 2020). Information Vacuum and

illiteracy are the main Threats in the implementation of the concept of HANRUH, because poor crisis communications will induce public confusion, whereby poor media literacy will lead to media hijacks and hypes by potential enemies. Unverified information or fake news travels on social media much faster as compared to other mainstream channels. Therefore, accurate information from credible official source must fill-up the vacuum swiftly, as well as counter misinformation. In the present digital age, radical extremist groups have conveniently extended their networking arena by manipulating the advancement of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). These digital technologies provide essential elements for their 'underground' propaganda, such as anonymity; low cost; persuasive content enrichment; global audiences, interactive connectivity. Based on the report in 2016, the Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) revealed that social media contributed 75 percent of Daesh's recruitment in Malaysia, specifically through Facebook (Samuel 2016).

From 2001 to 2014, there were over 420 Malaysians alleged to be involved in terrorist group activities arrested by the authorities, including MAF personnel. The sudden spike of religious extremists and the sympathisers in Malaysia has forced the government to take drastic enforcement actions (Mohd Mizan 2017). Besides the radical groups' propaganda, the lone wolf attacker poses a potential threats to the internal security of a country. Cases of individuals' influence on social media range from posted racism hatred comments towards most extreme incidents, such as the Christchurch mass shooting that happened in March 2019 (Wilson & Thomson 2019). Ultimately, it is the responsibility of every social media user to analyse and to verify using fact-checking services such as *Sebenarnya.my* provided by MCMC since 2017. The tagline *Tidak pasti, jangan kongsi* literally means if not sure don't share it, is to remind the public to avoid unintentionally creating panic and confusion in the community, thus jeopardising social security. MAF is facing a brand new domain of security threats from a limitless cyberspace which has no boundaries nor borders to defence. Besides cyber threats, infodemic could be one of the potential national security vulnerabilities. The responsibility lies on the whole-of-society to put a stop to the extremist ideology propaganda and the spreading of materials that could harm social harmony.

MITIGATIONS - CONSTRUCTIVISM APPROACH

Taking defence strategic into considerations the analysis concludes mitigation approach for every challenges faced by MAF as presented in Table 2. Through the lens of selected constructivist scholars and by embracing their insightful assumption as compiled in

Tsai (2019) from the International Relations perspective, translated into the context of social science. The Political Will can be enhanced with National Preference, Inter-agency Rivalry can be mitigated by Collective Identity, while Security Context can be shaped by Cultural Identity and lastly, the Information Vacuum can be fill-up by Knowledge and Norms.

TABLE 2 Key Findings – SWOT Analysis & Constructivist Approaches

SWOT	Challenges	Mitigation Approach
Strength	- Good Governance	National Preference
-Political Will	- DWP 2020 - Transparency - Voice of Military Veteran - Equilibrium Civil-Military Relations	The practice of good governance is derived from the determination of Political Will to use DWP as a tool of Transparency
Weakness -Inter-agency Rivalry	- MAF as supporting role in HANRUH - Rivalry for prestige & funding - ESSCOM - Overlapping power & duties - ESSCOM - Limitation on authority – OP BENTENG	Collective Identity Inter-agency cooperation is derived from the values of collective identity & constitutional authorities
Opportunity-Security Context	- Malayan Emergency - Lahad Datu Incident – OP DAULAT - Seasonal Flash Floods – OP MURNI - COVID-19 Pandemic – OP PENAWAR	Cultural Identity MAF professionalism and preparedness are derived from the shaping of culture and identity
Threat - Information Vacuum	- Negative Impact of Media - Extremist propaganda in social media - Poor Public Awareness - Misperception – corruptions, failed projects	Knowledge and Norms knowledge and norms come from information-building transformed from Media & Public Visibility

Source: Compiled by Author

Finnemore (1996) argued that national preferences are determined through social interaction domestically and internationally. Likewise, in the context of the Southeast Asia region, ASEAN should promote the core values of good governance and discourage the malpractice of corruption or cryptocracy among its member states. The external pressure from global and regional spirit could help shape the national preferences of Malaysia. Domestically, NGOs and social movements such as PATRIOT, The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM), and Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (BERSIH) including MAF itself must strategise to keep-up the political will of ruling administration to promote accountability, integrity, and transparency. The practice of good governance is derived from the determination of Political Will to use DWP as a tool of transparency. Since the previous government had shown effort in publishing the first DWP, the MAF must retain the momentum of good governance practice in the current administration and promote the concept of HANRUH. Good governance is a vital step for the ruling government to guarantee the nation's security, peace, and political stability.

Wendt (1996) suggested that interdependency will form a collective identity, thus promoting inter-agency cooperation. In the context of the HANRUH concept, the values of mutual identity should be shaped by constitutional authorities. Under the current Malaysian Constitution, MAF is the stakeholder of the defence sector under the military domain as part of the overall HANRUH defence concept. MAF has no legal authority to coordinate with any other civil agencies in the operationalisation of HANRUH. Until the National Security Council Bill 2015 was passed in parliament, NSC served as the authority responsible for the national security. However, the reformation of NSC does not immediately solve the issue of overlapping of power and duties. The contemporary non-traditional threats, such as trans-border organised crimes have made the thin line between security and defence even more blurry. The rivalry among existing security forces and the newly formed law enforcement agencies getting worse due to scarcity in resources. To mitigate this blurry loophole, a more holistic and pragmatic constitutional authority should be given to the agency with the most capability to defend the national sovereignty. Considering the current fiscal constraints, it is high time for the government to minimising the redundancy of civil service agencies, thus minimise the bureaucracy. The recently set-up of the National Task Force (NTF) in April 2020, the MAF is tasked to coordinate the joint operation and harness security enforcement agencies. The immediate achievements are inspiring. This collaborative setting should be maintained in the near future.

In Tsai (2009), Katzenstein asserts that Cultural Identity will alter organisation's interests and actions. Arguably, MAF's identity is impulsive and inconsistent. Since independence, MAF's strategic planning has been transformed from counter-insurgency towards conventional forces in the early '80s, from a threat-based policy

became capability-based defence policy (Ananthan & Inderjit 2014). However, in the recently published DWP it has shifted to an interest-based defence approach (MINDEF 2020). As a result of dynamic shifting in the NDP without a consistent baseline, MAF has to strike a balance in terms of preparedness between its core functions and secondary functions. This is one of the dilemmas faced by MAF in operationalising the concept of HANRUH. Generally, in public opinion MAF is still trapped in a traditional military culture identity. The opportunities for MAF's engagements in either internal armed conflicts, regional HADR, or extra-regional operations such as missions under UN's flagship, should serve as MAF's cultural identity.

Consequently, this cultural identity will help to shape MAF's capability preparedness as a Future Force. Challenges of MAF's preparedness might further intensified by the scarcity of resources and broader responsibilities. Looking at the contemporary security environment, MAF personnel must be well trained in both conventional military roles and the soft skills of dealing with the public. In terms of defence management, every crisis is an opportunity to learn. The opportunity of engaging a severe security environment in Malaysia is considered rare, Professionalism and Preparedness are the essential requirements to grab the opportunity to enhance civil-military relations. It is a necessity to formulate a well-balanced strategic doctrine on both conventional and non-traditional threats. Effectiveness and efficiency in handling a crisis will save lives. It is for confidence building, and to win the hearts and minds of the public at large.

Knowledge and Norms is the best approach to fill the gaps on the Information Vacuum and negative impact of media. Onuf, as cited by Tsai (2009) suggested that the power of knowledge will shape public norms through the process of interaction. To achieve the objective of educating civil society about HANRUH, the approaches and insightful strategy must be design diligently to penetrate every level of society. Leong (2020) asserts that HANRUH must be indoctrinated from pre-school to university levels in order to foster a new generation that is embedded with theoretical and practical perspectives. The Ministry of Education should encourage schools to organise field trips to nearby military or civil defence institutions for academic purposes. Meanwhile, MAF must optimise the social media and enhance public visibility to instil patriotism and volunteerism among the society. The government officials should at least publicise the term HANRUH to the public community and other government agencies in order to facilitate MAF organises HANRUH related collaboration activities.

HANRUH – A NATION'S CALL

NSC is the federal agency responsible for managing and coordinating the implementation of policies related to the security of Malaysia under the NSC Act 2016, Act 776. Directly under the Prime Minister Office, ideally NSC should be the agency to

initiate the HANRUH policy. Research has shown among high ranking and senior MAF officers share the same opinion that in order to operationalise HANRUH effectively, it requires a *Nation Call* (Mohd Radzi, et al. 2020). The Head of MAF writing team for the Malaysia's first DWP in 2019, Major General (Rtd) Dato' Mahendra, asserts the necessity to have a "powerful driving force" that can call for unity of the whole-of-nation, to defend national interest and sovereignty (Mahendra 2020). "Our people can do it but just need to be told," said Brigadier General Omar regarding the concept of HANRUH. During the interview related to OP MURNI, Afendi (2020) appealed that "we [MAF] are ready to serve [the nation], but they [the government] should give us proper equipment and empower us." Paraphrasing from the pledge of US Marine Corps, the man will always go beyond what they can do best in answering to a Nation's Call. The achievement of Malaysia in combating the COVID-19 pandemic, has shown that the majority of Malaysian civil society and government services are resilient and cooperative in defending the country, it just needs a credible voice to call them out for their support. Bearing in mind that the security environments are volatile most of the time, simultaneous multiple agencies involvement is required to enforce the security measurements. There are three basic steps to be considered by the ruling administration to make the "call", based on who, why, what, when, where and how:

1. To identify who is in-charge. To assign a dedicated agency or department to run the HANRUH campaign nation-wide. Ideally NSC should shoulder this responsibility. The campaign should be designed to initiate the signal of the Nation Call, to inform and educate the civil society about why and when to defend the national interest.
2. To determine where to focus. Based on contemporary security environments, the security sectors that require public attention are according to the six domains adopted from comparative study: military defence, civil defence, economic defence, social defence, psychological defence and digital defence.
3. To formulate how and what to defend. This task should be delegated to the respective professional agencies according to the security domain. The government must let the experts formulate a proactive initiative and innovative prevention programme for each domain. For instance, the MOH has played a central role and is well supported by other government entities in the current pandemic situation.

CONCLUSION

The finding of this study indicates that MAF is facing four main challenges in operationalising the concept of HANRUH. MAF needs a strong and consistent 'political will' to enhance its strength according to the good governance concept stipulated in DWP. MAF's challenges in inter-agencies rivalry might be further intensified by the scarcity of resources and broader responsibilities. The cohesive cooperation must be derived from the values of collective identity and concise constitutional authorities.

Under contemporary security context, MAF must uphold its military professionalism and preparedness to grab the unique opportunity to win the hearts and minds of the people. MAF should nurture and establish its own authentic, resilient cultural identity for the future force.

It is a necessity to formulate a well-balanced strategic doctrine on both conventional and non-traditional threats. Knowledge and norms is the best approach to fill the gaps of the information vacuum and negative impact of media. MAF must optimise the digital technology to instil patriotism and volunteerism among the society. The responsibility of national defence must be shared among the government entities and the public as well. Both civilian and military organisations must complement each other to become one of the national powers. It requires good governance and trustworthy leadership to make the nation call.

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